The Topicality of the Difference Thesis by Merz, Martina
  
 
Science, Technology & Innovation Studies,  






The Topicality of the Difference Thesis 
Revisiting Constructivism and the Laboratory 
Martina Merz (Technology and Society Laboratory, EMPA St. Gallen and 
OSPS, University of Lausanne) 
 
Abstract 
Within science and technology studies, constructivism has never existed as a single 
variant but under alternative interpretations. In this article it is argued that the 
different variants have maintained their topicality in unequal measure. It focuses 
on two variants of constructivism: The first emphasizes the isomorphism of scien-
tific and other practices and insists that there are no epistemic particularities in 
scientific knowledge production (“analogy approach”); the second accounts for the 
success of contemporary science by relating it to the specifics of scientific laborato-
ries (“difference approach”). In this paper it is argued that the second variant can 
provide a set of challenging research problems that have not, to date, been suffi-
ciently addressed in the literature. The problems center on the relation between 
laboratories and contexts of application, as well as on the concept of the laboratory 
and its possible extensions. In contrast, the issues associated with the analogy 
approach have been well explored in previous bodies of work. This article develops 
a research agenda for a constructivist account of knowledge production that may be 
employed within other discourses in the social sciences. 
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1 Introduction: Constructiv-
ism in Social Studies of Sci-
ence 
This article1 addresses the claim that 
constructivism in science studies has 
lost its provocative gist and potential to 
surprise.2 On the basis of the observa-
tion that, in the social studies of sci-
ence, constructivism has never existed 
as a single variant but under alterna-
tive interpretations, the article pro-
poses a rephrasing of this claim. What 
are these different variants and accord-
ing to what criteria may they be distin-
guished? Surprisingly, only few at-
tempts have been undertaken to sort 
through and systematically classify the 
different understandings of construc-
tivism. One exception is an article by 
Sergio Sismondo (1993), who main-
tains that the construction metaphor 
has at least four different uses and 
interpretations. Sismondo’s article 
received wide attention and was the 
subject of controversial discussion for 
two reasons: first, because of its at-
tempt to bring some order into the 
muddle of constructivist interpreta-
tions; secondly, because of the way it 
evaluated the significance of these four 
interpretations for the practice of STS. 
Sismondo differentiates constructivism 
with respect to the types of entities that 
have been constructed and identifies 
four types of entities: (a) social objects 
(e.g. knowledge, methodologies, hab-
its) – the associated form of construc-
tivism exhibiting affinity with “social 
constructivism” in the spirit of Berger 
and Luckmann (1966); (b) conceptual 
entities (e.g. theories, accounts, im-
ages) – the focus in this case being on 
how patterns or structures are gener-
                                                             
1 I thank Richard Randell and two review-
ers for their valuable comments on this 
article. 
2 See, for example, the call for papers of the 
2004 Annual Meeting of the GWTF “Was 
kommt nach dem Konstruktivismus in der 
Wissenschafts- und Technikforschung” 
(Berlin, November 26-27, 2004). 
ated from data and observations; (c) 
artifacts – herewith shifting interest to 
the level of material interventions in 
the laboratory; and (d) objects of 
thought and representation. The last 
variety, labeled also “idealist,” “neo-
Kantian” or “strong” constructivism, 
forms the most controversial interpre-
tation as it asserts that material objects 
(“nature”) are construed out of world-
views (“science”). Strong constructiv-
ism has been a matter of particular 
contention between philosophers of 
science and the more radical construc-
tivists in the field of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge; the controversy 
then spreading to other audiences in 
the wake of what was to become known 
as the “science wars.” 
Sismondo’s contribution to the debate 
on constructivism consists – which 
relates to the second issue above – in 
his ranking of the different constructiv-
ist interpretations by importance. In 
particular, he downplays “strong 
constructivism” by considering it to be 
the least important interpretation for 
actual work done in social studies of 
science. This has led Karin Knorr 
Cetina (1993) to counter with a “strong 
constructivist thesis,” according to 
which “the world is slowly molded into 
shape in ever new ways through suc-
cessive generations of (scientific) 
practice” (Knorr Cetina 1993: 560). 
Other respondents have contested 
Sismondo on different grounds. Peter 
Taylor (1995), for example, has criti-
cized the specific attention accorded to 
the type of entities produced, suggest-
ing instead that the focus of attention 
be the different processes of produc-
tion. He also argues for a stronger 
emphasis on “the process of science in 
the making as a co-construction” 
involving a diversity of agents and 
components (Taylor 1995: 353; cf. also 
Sismondo 1995). 
What we learn from Sismondo’s text 
and the critical responses it has trig-
gered is that constructivism in social 
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studies of science is above all a multi-
faceted thing.3 It comes in different 
interpretations, each of which may 
serve specific theoretical or practical 
purposes and be part of a dedicated 
research program. The debate also 
hints at the possibility that different 
variants of constructivism follow 
different trajectories. This idea will be 
further explored in the present text, 
albeit with a focus on a different 
scheme of constructivist interpreta-
tions. Two interpretations that follow 
from the science-as-practice approach 
in the social studies of science with its 
interest in the constructive elements of 
scientific production are juxtaposed. 
The first interpretation stresses the 
analogy of scientific practice and other 
forms of practice and asserts that there 
is no epistemic particularity in scien-
tific production (analogy thesis); the 
second interpretation seeks to account 
for the remarkable success of contem-
porary science and hence inquires into 
the specifics of scientific production 
(difference thesis). 
The proposed distinction, which to 
date has not been discussed systemati-
cally in the science studies literature, 
allows one to separate off one variant 
of constructivism which, I argue, opens 
up interesting perspectives for future 
research, from a second variant whose 
general mechanisms are today rather 
well understood. The present article 
thus addresses the topicality of the two 
approaches in a double sense: On the 
one hand, it investigates the potential 
of both approaches to raise interesting 
                                                             
3 This article will be concerned with con-
structivism in social studies of science only. 
It will not address other “Spielarten des 
Konstruktivismus,” as Knorr Cetina (1989) 
denotes different varieties that range from 
“social constructivism” as mapped out by 
Berger and Luckmann (1966) to “radical 
constructivism” in sociology (for example, 
the work of Luhmann) and the empirical 
program of constructivism in the sociology 
of science. For a discussion of different 
interpretations of constructivism in the 
social sciences and humanities see Hacking 
(1999). 
new questions and perspectives for 
future work. On the other hand, it 
explores the topicality of the two 
approaches in the sense of their 
“aboutness” (Reinhardt 1981)4 through 
drawing out the topical fields to which 
they relate. 
In section 2 the two constructivist 
approaches will first be situated in the 
science-as-practice approach and then 
introduced in more detail. The follow-
ing sections address two issues which, 
it is proposed, should generate ques-
tions for further research: the header 
“transcending the laboratory” hints at 
the relation between laboratories and 
contexts of application, which is ex-
plored for each of the approaches 
(section 3); the concept of the labora-
tory and its possible extensions is 
discussed with particular reference to 
the “difference approach” (section 4). 
2 Constructivism and Con-
cepts of the Laboratory 
An interest in the process of knowledge 
production emerged in the late 1970s, 
just a few years after the new sociology 
of scientific knowledge (SSK) had 
taken off. Both the constructivist 
approach and SSK are convinced that 
science is not to be investigated merely 
as a social institution (in the tradition 
of Merton) but that science’s epistemic 
core is a matter of investigation in its 
own right. In respect to their perspec-
tives on science’s epistemic core, 
however, the two approaches are 
complementary. Whereas SSK focuses 
primarily on the social causes of the 
scientists’ convictions and knowledge-
beliefs – on science as knowledge – the 
constructivist approach turns its atten-
                                                             
4 A related notion of topicality is addressed 
in linguistics. Michael Lynch (1991) pur-
sues a different notion of how knowledge 
production is “sited” by providing two 
examples of “topical contextures” that 
define spatial orders associated with 
complexes of equipment and practice. 
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tion to the constructive elements of 
scientific production – on science as 
practice. Interest in the process of 
knowledge production has led to a 
greater appreciation that science is a 
practical accomplishment. One of its 
most significant observations has been 
that scientific practice is firmly em-
bedded in local environments and 
should, consequently, be investigated 
in situ, thus bringing the privileged 
sites of knowledge production into 
view – the scientific laboratories. The 
social analysts’ interest in the labora-
tory and its goings-on has given rise to 
the “laboratory studies approach” – the 
exploration of the minutiae of everyday 
scientific practice through participant 
observation methods, combined with 
ethnomethodology and discourse 
analysis.5 
The science-as-practice approach has 
led to constructivist interpretations 
that are intimately linked to concep-
tions of the scientific laboratory. I 
distinguish two complementary inter-
pretations, both of which have been 
elaborated by the same set of authors 
and which represent different focal 
points and targets of argumentation. 
While the first contends that scientific 
practice does not substantially differ 
epistemically from other realms of 
social practice (2.1), the second ex-
plores the reasons for the success of 
science and, thus, zooms in on sci-
ence’s unique features (2.2). 
2.1 Analogy Thesis 
The first perspective views laboratory 
research as inextricably tied to the 
locales in which knowledge is pro-
duced (for an overview see e.g. Lynch 
1997: chap. 3). The laboratory is seen 
as a repository of competences, prac-
tices, tools and resources that the 
scientists draw upon. Scientists exploit 
the contingencies of local contexts with 
                                                             
5 The first laboratory studies were pub-
lished in the 1980s, for an overview see 
Knorr Cetina (1995). 
respect to the equipment and research 
facilities at hand, the interactional 
circumstances, the conventions em-
bodied in laboratories, the combined 
expertise gathered in a research team 
and the organizational setting in which 
it is embedded. Scientists draw on a 
whole repertoire of improvisations and 
tentative solutions, different forms of 
tinkering and embodied skills, as well 
as different techniques of persuasion 
and negotiation. The research prob-
lems, consequently, are locally consti-
tuted, as are the research objects, the 
tools, and the ways in which scientists 
handle and assemble all these ele-
ments. Out of this seemingly messy set 
of things and actions, scientists “pro-
duce order” (Latour/Woolgar 1979) as 
they conceal the messy traces of their 
work. This implies that science does 
not merely represent reality as it is 
“out there;” scientific work is construc-
tive. What later appears as a natural 
phenomenon or as unproblematic data 
is the outcome of a complex produc-
tion and selection process. Thus, 
scientific practice is also an interpre-
tive, representational and literary 
activity. Data and other outcomes and 
products of scientific practice are 
rarely – some would say never – un-
ambiguous, complete, definite and 
univocal. They retain a high degree of 
interpretative flexibility. 
The observations of the locally situated 
nature of scientific work with its high 
degree of contingency as well as the 
negotiated character of all the steps 
that intervene in the process of fact 
construction have led laboratory 
analysts to the conclusion that “noth-
ing epistemically special is happening” 
(Knorr Cetina 1995: 151) in scientific 
knowledge production.6 
 
                                                             
6 For a detailed account of the local situat-
edness of research see Knorr Cetina (1984: 
chapter 2); for a specification of the con-
cept “locally organized activities” see Lynch 
(1997: 125-133). 
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2.2 Difference Thesis 
A second perspective identifies the 
laboratory as the paramount site of 
knowledge production in modern 
science. Although scientific knowledge 
is of course also produced at other 
sites, the laboratory has come to sym-
bolize the power and success of science 
– a development that originated in the 
19th century. Bruno Latour and Karin 
Knorr Cetina, among others, have 
convincingly maintained that this 
power relies on specific forms of object 
work that are performed in – and are 
constitutive of – the laboratory. 
In his discussion piece “Give Me a 
Laboratory and I will Raise the World,” 
Bruno Latour (1983)7 argues that 
scientists gain strength in the labora-
tory by inverting the hierarchy of 
forces according to their research 
interests. They do this by reversing the 
scale of phenomena at will in the 
laboratory, making some objects 
bigger, others smaller. For example, 
organisms are isolated and cultivated 
in a suitable milieu, which allows them 
to grow exponentially and become 
visible to the scientist’s eye. As a con-
sequence, scientists are enabled to do 
things in the laboratory that are not 
feasible outside the laboratory, where 
the existing scales are unmanageable 
and cannot be negotiated. The varia-
tion of scales has another favorable 
effect: it enables scientists to multiply 
experiments at reduced cost, allowing 
for an increased number of trials and 
errors. As a consequence, the labora-
tory turns into a learning environment, 
“a technological device to gain strength 
by multiplying mistakes” (ibid.).8 
                                                             
7 For a thoughtful account that challenges 
Latour’s claim that laboratories (in all 
cases) “raise the world” see Scott (1991). 
8 For the idea that the multiplication of 
errors allows for a reduction of uncertainty, 
see, in a different context, Donald 
MacKenzie’s (2000) discussion of com-
puter systems: “a computer system that 
errs frequently (and is therefore distrusted) 
Karin Knorr Cetina (1992) similarly 
argues that the laboratory is “an en-
hanced environment” (ibid. 116) and 
that this accounts for the success of 
science. The mechanism that brings 
this about is the reconfigurating of 
subject-object-relations to the scien-
tists’ advantage, which can be viewed 
as a generalized notion of Latour’s 
scale reversal. In the laboratory the 
phenomena of investigation are re-
moved from their natural context. 
Scientists reshape them in order to 
control their temporal and spatial 
accessibility and render them fit for 
experimentation.9 Lab objects can be 
duplicated, standardized and made 
amenable to a full sequence of experi-
ments (cf. Amann 1994). In addition, 
social relations are reconfigured – 
“upgraded” in Knorr Cetina’s terms – 
and aligned with the specific require-
ments of the objects in the lab. For 
example, collaborations are forged to 
confront the object world optimally, 
with form and size of collaborations 
differing widely across fields. Another 
example is provided by scientists who 
assume the function of human measur-
ing devices or who become important 
repositories of unconscious experience. 
To summarize this perspective: Knowl-
edge production is closely associated 
with a specific mode of relations be-
tween the scientists and their labora-
tory objects. The power of the labora-
tory stems from the reconfigurations 
that shift the balance of subject-object 
relations to the benefit of the scientists. 
This mechanism accounts for the 
                                                                          
 
is, under some circumstances, less danger-
ous than one that almost never errs” (ibid. 
183). 
9 Objects are not only technically manufac-
tured, they are also symbolically and 
politically construed (e.g. by way of literary 
techniques of persuasion) which resonates 
more closely with the characterization of 
laboratories according to the “analogy 
approach.” 
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difference between the laboratory (and 
the subject-object-dynamics it defines) 
and other societal settings and turns it 
into an “enhanced environment.” 
Although they were developed by the 
same community of researchers the 
analogy approach and the difference 
approach have followed different 
trajectories and they have advanced at 
an uneven pace. The analogy approach 
has provoked a curious mix of praise, 
considerable attention and controver-
sial reactions from colleagues, espe-
cially in its earlier years – and it was 
hotly debated once again by self-
selected proponents of the sciences 
during what some have termed the 
“science wars” of the late 1990s. The 
difference approach, in contrast, has 
stayed largely out of the limelight. 
The two variants have maintained their 
topicality in unequal measure also with 
respect to the associated research 
programs. The analogy approach has 
brought about a thorough understand-
ing of the open, contingent and negoti-
ated character of scientific work and of 
the processes and mechanisms it 
involves. Due to its earlier productivity 
and success one may hypothesize that 
the approach neither challenges nor 
surprises science studies scholars to 
the same extent any longer. By contrast 
the difference approach, which has 
never been as controversial and as 
publicized as its sibling, provides still 
today a challenging research agenda. 
To spell out what this challenge might 
look like, two sets of issues are dis-
cussed in the following two sections (3 
and 4). 
3 Transcending the Labora-
tory 
Laboratory studies have convincingly 
demonstrated that knowledge produc-
tion in the lab is a locally situated 
activity. This raises two important 
issues that concern the boundaries of 
the laboratory and which deserve 
further consideration. A first perspec-
tive on the relation of the laboratory 
and its boundaries focuses on how 
results that were locally produced in 
the lab can be successfully exported 
and transferred to other settings. What 
are the mechanisms through which 
scientific statements or facts transcend 
the laboratory and link up with very 
different problem contexts and societal 
settings? The two variants of construc-
tivism provide different answers and 
raise further questions, which will be 
detailed in the next paragraphs. A 
second perspective focuses instead on 
the confines of the laboratory; that is, 
on the lab and its possible extensions. 
Such extensions, and their implica-
tions, are addressed through extending 
both the concept of the laboratory and 
the physical spaces available for em-
pirical investigation (section 4). The 
two perspectives are separated here for 
analytical reasons, however, when 
addressed in the context of specific 
research problems in a dedicated 
project they will need to be considered 
jointly.  
3.1 Analogy Approach 
For the analogy approach, how state-
ments or facts transcend the laboratory 
does not pose a specific challenge. If 
there are no epistemic differences 
between the practice of knowledge 
production in the laboratory and other 
kinds of (non-scientific) practice, as 
posited by this approach, then it 
should come as no surprise that the 
exporting of results beyond the 
boundaries of the laboratory should be, 
at least in principle, unproblematic. 
This still requires that the specific 
transfer mechanisms are spelt out in 
detail, which they have. The analogy 
approach argues for a continuity of 
practice. Through the identification of 
a variety of strategies that are em-
ployed by scientists, studies in this 
tradition have shown how local prod-
ucts are turned into universal scientific 
facts. One important strategy of scien-
tists is to employ a full chain of repre-
sentations, of which visualizations 
provide an interesting example. The 
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visualizations with which scientists 
work do not simply portray nature; 
they are the result of a multilevel 
process of production, translation, and 
transformation. The intricate visualiza-
tion and representation practices are 
conceived as a “transformation of rats 
and chemicals into paper” (Latour 
1986) that not only fosters understand-
ing of research problems and results 
but also assists scientists in communi-
cating their results across local con-
texts and in convincing their colleagues 
of the work’s importance and validity. 
Another strategy involves decontextu-
alization – the production of objectiv-
ity effects through a step-by-step 
removal of reference to local contin-
gence: Scientists do not disclose the 
open, contingent, and negotiated 
character of practical work in their 
accounts but instead produce con-
densed and purified versions of what 
goes on in the laboratory. Objectivity 
effects derive from rhetorical proce-
dures, through which statements are 
transformed into solidified facts. 
Scientists, consequently, seem to be 
simply “reporting natural facts;” the 
constructed nature of knowledge 
disappears from view. 
The general mechanisms by which 
statements are turned into facts and 
then travel within scientific communi-
ties and cross the boundaries of science 
have been well documented in this 
approach; this does not seem to be the 
case for the second. 
3.2 Difference Approach 
From the perspective of the difference 
approach the answer is less obvious. 
How can one explain that what holds 
within the confined settings of a labo-
ratory is also valid outside of it? One 
might rather hypothesize the contrary 
– that the reconfigurations performed 
in the laboratory transform the config-
ured entities in such a way that the 
results obtained by manipulating them 
are not transferable to the “world” in 
an unproblematic manner. This hy-
pothesis follows from the assumption 
of an asymmetry between the labora-
tory and the world that underlies the 
difference approach. The laboratory 
order appears as clearly distinct from 
the natural order, the laboratory being 
characterized by a “homing in” (Knorr 
Cetina) of natural processes. This 
observation thus calls for an explicit 
discussion of the transfer modes of 
laboratory outcomes and their respec-
tive validity. It may come as a surprise 
that the processes of what one may call 
“re-reconfiguration” – how laboratory 
outcomes are successfully embedded 
into socio-material contexts beyond 
the laboratory – has not received 
sufficient attention.10 There are, how-
ever, several important exceptions. 
In his study on Pasteur, Bruno Latour 
(1988) provides an original account of 
how what holds in the laboratory is 
rendered valid also for application in 
other settings. Latour explains Pas-
teur’s success in the world outside the 
laboratory – measured, for example, by 
the effectiveness of the vaccine – by 
the fact that the external world had 
been made to comply with the labora-
tory conditions. The stables, for exam-
ple, had to adopt strict hygiene condi-
tions and the sheep were vaccinated. 
While Latour’s argument is convincing 
for the case at hand, one wonders how 
instructive it is for other cases. Do 
fields beyond the laboratory impera-
tively need to be molded according to 
laboratory conditions for laboratory-
produced knowledge to be successfully 
applied in practice?  
A general framework for explaining the 
success of scientists is provided by 
Actor-Network-Theory (ANT), for 
which Pasteur and other studies are 
illustrative (e.g. Callon 1986; Latour 
1988, 2005). According to ANT, suc-
cess does not result from the truth of 
the results that are put into practice 
                                                             
10 For a similar assessment, see Heintz 
(1993: 545-546, note 34). 
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but is a function of how the laboratory 
is positioned in society. Scientists must 
successfully manage a heterogeneous 
network of actants (human actors, 
natural objects, material entities, etc.), 
they must capture the interest of 
previously uninterested outsiders, 
enroll actants into the network as 
allies, and translate and stabilize the 
actants’ interests. Translation – the re-
interpretation or appropriation of 
others’ interests into one’s own – is the 
key strategy employed to mobilize 
broader support. The network needs to 
be stabilized for a scientific fact or 
result to assume significance outside 
its production context and be turned 
into a black box.  
Actor-Network-Theory has been very 
influential due to its radical reformula-
tion of nature-society relations and of 
the dynamics that unfold from unsta-
ble states of nature/society. In respect 
to the question under consideration 
here, it provides a general answer at a 
high level of abstraction. This leaves 
the door open to alternative interpreta-
tions, especially if one is interested in 
the minutiae of social-epistemic prac-
tice and the specific solutions that 
different problem areas and scientific 
fields elaborate to provide for and 
guarantee the transferability of labora-
tory results. If this is the focus, one will 
need to move beyond the (too) general 
frame of ANT. A few suggestions for 
relevant questions and instructive 
cases to be considered in more detail 
are sketched in the following. 
3.3 The Game of Disembedding 
and Re-embedding 
Knowledge about the transferability of 
scientific results to settings beyond the 
laboratory is distributed unequally 
throughout the scientific spectrum. 
Whereas scientific fields closer to 
application contexts need to handle the 
problem of transferability explicitly, 
other subject areas disengage from the 
issue to pursue a purely “internalist” 
research agenda. In so far as laboratory 
studies have focused on typical labo-
ratory sciences, the question of the 
transferability of results has remained 
in the background, simply because it 
was of minor interest to the observed 
practitioners. This raises the question 
of which scientific areas might render 
an investigation of the game of “dis-
embedding” and “re-embedding” 
practices particularly insightful and 
productive – the “game” denoting, on 
the one hand, the dynamic interrela-
tion between the subject-object recon-
figurations that account for the power 
of the laboratory and, on the other 
hand, the strategies that connect the 
ensuing outcomes with broader con-
texts. It should be noted, however, that 
what constitutes these “broader con-
texts” of interest has to be identified  
separately for each and every case. For 
example, the contexts may range from 
adjacent fields of research to other 
scientific areas or even to extra-
scientific domains. 
The first recommendation of this 
article is that the difference approach 
be brought to bear on studies of re-
search areas that vary in the degree to 
which “strongly contextualized knowl-
edge” (Nowotny et al. 2001) is pro-
duced. Environmental sciences, medi-
cal sciences and engineering sciences 
are instructive cases. To date very little 
is known about the dynamic relation 
between laboratory cultures and the 
strategies employed to ensure the 
practical validity of results, which 
raises the additional question of the 
origins of evaluative practices and 
standards in the sciences. For example, 
do contemporary societal preferences 
for knowledge that is certified accord-
ing to scientific standards have an 
influence on the reconfiguration prac-
tices in scientific laboratories? A com-
parative perspective would provide 
interesting insights into both the field-
specific practices and the more general 
mechanisms by which laboratory 
knowledge is exported. 
The second recommendation is that 
science scholars explore more system-
atically the epistemic practices that 
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account for the disembedding and the 
re-embedding of objects and results. In 
this context a focus on modeling prac-
tices is of considerable interest. Models 
of all sorts (physical models, proto-
types, model systems, formal models, 
computer models, etc.) play an essen-
tial role in knowledge production in 
general, and in the reconfiguration of 
objects in particular. They have re-
cently been taken up as prominent 
topics of investigation in science stud-
ies, albeit not sufficiently in respect to 
the perspective presented here (cf. 
Knuuttila et al., in press). In the fol-
lowing I will present one important 
example: computer simulation as an 
epistemic practice that navigates 
continuously between the require-
ments of object reconfiguration and 
outcome re-embedding, which has 
become a key epistemic strategy across 
a wide range of scientific fields (cf. for 
a recent overview Lenhard et al. 2006).  
Phenomena are numerically config-
ured to render them amenable to 
experimentation in simulation studies. 
In many cases, to construct the nu-
merical models that underlie the 
simulation involves a complex chain of 
modeling steps and approximations 
(cf. Winsberg 1999). From this per-
spective the computer appears as a 
functional equivalent of the work-
benches of a traditional laboratory 
science, and simulation studies are 
perceived as being performed in a 
digital laboratory. Simulation allows 
scientists to mimic, shape and experi-
ment on natural, technical or formal 
processes and phenomena such as 
natural systems or research appara-
tuses. Scientists exploit these options 
for various purposes: they explore new 
spaces of action, probe the conse-
quences of theoretical assumptions or 
investigate the dynamics of a natural 
system. 
What is important in the context of the 
present discussion is that studies of 
simulation practices reveal the need to 
carefully consider the disembedding as 
well as the re-embedding dynamics of 
object work (cf. Merz 2006). This is 
due to the fact that a simulation study 
in many cases is not an end in itself: it 
is typically explicitly targeted to the 
solution of practical problems, as its 
application in the environmental 
sciences (e.g. climate research) testi-
fies. In many cases, simulation studies 
simultaneously address a scientific 
problem and produce predictions of 
use to other (often non-expert) com-
munities within or outside science. The 
scientists must actively negotiate the 
balance between the reconfiguration 
and the re-embedding requirements of 
the study: reconfiguration – the trans-
formation of objects as they occur “in 
nature” into the objects worked on in 
laboratories – requires a form of 
disembedding. Reconfigured objects 
are easier to deal with and it is possible 
to extract results from them in ways 
that advantage the scientist precisely 
because they have been partly disem-
bedded from their natural environ-
ments. The work of re-embedding is 
required to link up the outcomes of 
simulation studies with the practical 
problem that motivated the study at its 
onset. The mechanisms and strategies 
that are employed to ensure that the 
results can be successfully transferred 
to sites beyond the laboratory are 
context-dependent: they may vary with 
the considered scientific area, the 
concerned scientific problem or the 
public significance of the issue at hand. 
The practice of how to transcend the 
digital laboratory may also involve very 
different systems of reference. Simula-
tion studies in fields like particle 
physics, for example, are disciplined by 
the parallel performance of “real” (in 
contrast to computer) experiments: 
simulation results need to prove them-
selves in comparison to “real data,”11 
which perhaps explains why the dis-
embedding tendencies of simulation in 
particle physics tend to be controlled 
                                                             
11 In this case the transfer needs to prove 
itself in yet another laboratory, which 
makes the digital lab a lab in (and a part of) 
another lab (cf. Knorr Cetina 1999). 
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and kept in closely observed bounds. 
Whether this is the case also in prob-
lem areas that are inaccessible by way 
of material experimentation is a matter 
for empirical investigation, as is the 
question of how the scientific validity 
of the results is assured in these 
cases.12 A twist to these variations is 
cases where simulation itself becomes 
part of a strategy to ensure the trans-
ferability of experimental results to the 
context of application. 
These observations illustrate that the 
scientific practice of modeling pro-
vides, first, an interesting field for 
investigating the transfer and transfer-
ability of scientific results beyond the 
narrow confines of its production 
context – the (digital) laboratory. 
Secondly, the study of modeling prac-
tice generates important questions 
regarding the power of laboratories, 
which can be asked of other laboratory 
practices for purposes of comparison. 
Thirdly, it allows us to review and 
refine the difference approach in 
constructivist science studies. 
4 Extending the Laboratory 
The difference approach raises a sec-
ond set of questions, concerning possi-
ble extensions of the laboratory con-
cept, the laboratory’s variable and 
shifting position in the sciences, and 
the different laboratory forms that 
have developed in science and, poten-
tially, in other societal realms. 
The first question relates to the con-
cept of the laboratory and the proc-
esses of object reconfiguration through 
which it is defined. As noted above, the 
notion of object reconfiguration can be 
productively extended to also include 
the alternate object worlds that are 
produced by computer simulation. 
                                                             
12 For the case of environmental sciences, 
see e.g. Oreskes (1998), Oreskes et al. 
(1994), Shackley/Wynne (1996), Wynne 
(1996). 
Computer simulation allows for the 
constitution of digital laboratories in 
which the phenomena under investiga-
tion are amenable to extremely flexible 
reconfiguration and manipulation. In 
this case, scientists are required to 
negotiate the different ontological 
orders and epistemic features between 
the simulated and the material object 
worlds. In current scientific practice, 
digital laboratories assume different 
positions and functions in the knowl-
edge production process. While simu-
lation may serve in certain cases as a 
substitute for “wet lab” experimenta-
tion, it is exploited in juxtaposition to 
wet lab experimentation in many other 
cases. In particle physics, for example, 
simulation parallels, precedes, frames 
and complements other experiment-
related activities, with each experimen-
tal phase drawing on simulation in 
specific ways (cf. Knorr Cetina 1999, 
Merz 2006). These observations hint at 
the possibility that different laboratory 
orders (digital lab, wet-lab, etc.) may 
become intertwined in the course of a 
scientific project. 
A second issue concerns the relation 
between laboratory practice and other 
modes of knowledge production in 
science – and what implications this 
has for the laboratory concept and the 
constitution of its boundaries. In 
accord with the logic of the difference 
approach, the early laboratory studies 
singled out the knowledge-production 
mechanisms of typical laboratory 
sciences as their topic of investigation. 
This raises the question of whether 
other epistemic forms deserve more 
consideration than they previously 
have been accorded. For example, 
recent work in the sociology and his-
tory of science has devoted increasing 
attention to the field sciences and their 
knowledge production regimes (cf. e.g. 
Kuklick/Kohler 1996). Modern field 
sciences combine field measurements 
with laboratory work, while “lab-
scapes” (Kohler 2002) either draw 
nature into the lab or bring the lab to 
the field. A traditional field science like 
astronomy can be conceived in its 
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present form as an image-producing 
laboratory science that transforms its 
phenomena in a computer-based 
laboratory and then processes them in 
the form of representations (cf. Knorr 
Cetina 1995). The clinical setting in 
modern biomedicine also constitutes a 
kind of field. An extended body of 
literature has begun to address the 
processes of mutual constitution 
between the laboratory and clinical 
practice (cf. Casper/Berg 1995). The 
lab-field border is managed and nego-
tiated differently in different sciences. 
These observations suggest that a more 
systematic investigation of the labora-
tory’s position and boundary practices 
in the context of other epistemic 
strategies and knowledge production 
regimes should be pursued. In line 
with the recent interest in the diversity 
of scientific cultures and the particu-
lars of fact construction, a challenge 
for future investigations lies in the 
direct comparison of laboratory cul-
tures (cf. Galison 1996). 
A third complex of issues revolves 
around the question of whether labora-
tories exist outside the institutions of 
science and research, specifically, at 
the science-society boundary. Under 
the header “society as laboratory” 
Krohn and Weyer (1989) have brought 
to our attention new ways that science 
is included in society, defined as a 
coincidence of research and implemen-
tation. In this case, the implementa-
tion of knowledge is the condition 
under which knowledge becomes 
validated and through which new 
research questions are generated (in 
fields such as genetic manipulation 
and human experiments in space). 
This gives rise to a new experimental 
situation, characterized by the impos-
sibility to set or influence its boundary 
conditions, and by the multiplicity of 
actors who perform according to 
different cognitive and evaluative 
categories. While the implied labora-
tory notion is distinct from the one 
underlying the difference approach, 
one wonders whether “real-world 
experiments” (Gross et al. 2003) in all 
instances are free of any form of sub-
ject-object reconfiguration that privi-
leges the knowledge-seeking parties, be 
they scientists or others or both at the 
same time. This question is associated 
with both an empirical research pro-
gram and a conceptual agenda. First, it 
is motivated by a desire to explore how 
the laboratory is an arrangement that, 
in its dynamic of subject-object recon-
figuration, belongs specifically (and 
perhaps even exclusively) to the realm 
of science in the present time. Sec-
ondly, it is motivated by a desire to 
investigate whether the laboratory 
concept of the difference approach can 
be fruitfully applied to knowledge 
production regimes at other societal 
sites and, should this be the case, to 
explore what one might learn about 
such regimes. The research agenda 
that underlies the present text is thus 
not to be misunderstood as a reifica-
tion of the difference approach: to 
assert that the difference approach still 
provides a challenging research agenda 
is not synonymous with accepting the 
claim that science is fundamentally 
different from other forms of societal 
practice. 
5 Conclusions 
The science-as-practice approach in 
the social studies of science has given 
rise to alternative interpretations of 
constructivism, two of which are 
revisited in this text. Both interpreta-
tions focus on the position of the 
laboratory in science. The first (the 
analogy approach) maintains that 
there are no epistemic particularities in 
scientific knowledge production, 
drawing on observations of the locally 
situated nature of scientific work. The 
second (the difference approach) 
accounts for the success of science by 
linking it to the specific reconfigura-
tion processes that symbolize the 
scientific laboratory. This paper has 
argued for the continuing topicality of 
the difference approach and its capac-
ity to generate challenging research 
questions. However, the fact that the 
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difference approach is privileged in 
this text is not to be interpreted as an 
assertion of its superiority over the 
analogy approach, which has provided 
us with a rich and detailed account of 
the manufactured and negotiated 
character of fact making. The power 
and fruitfulness of the difference 
approach lies in its attention to the 
specific subject-object relations and 
the reconfiguration processes that 
make up the laboratory qua enhanced 
environment. Although this article has 
focused on the differences, the analogy 
approach and the difference approach 
represent two sides of one coin. They 
are complementary and not in contra-
diction and, due to their common 
roots, they share defining tenets (the 
situated nature of knowledge produc-
tion, analyzing science as practice, 
etc.).  
Earlier laboratory studies privileged 
the investigation of typical laboratory 
sciences in order to identify the 
mechanisms that would account for 
the success of science. A promising 
next phase of research, it has been 
argued in this text, would be to extend 
both the topics and the fields of inves-
tigation within the difference ap-
proach. The section entitled “Tran-
scending the Laboratory” addressed 
the issue of how laboratory-produced 
knowledge can be exported success-
fully to application contexts beyond the 
narrow confines of the laboratory. This 
raises questions regarding the aware-
ness of scientists of the limitations and 
uncertainties of laboratorization proc-
esses and regarding their strategies 
and priorities for pondering “do-
ability” (Fujimura 1987) either in the 
laboratory or in practice – or their 
neglect to do so. It also raises ques-
tions regarding the boundaries of the 
laboratory and the division of labor 
spanning these boundaries, between 
those responsible for knowledge pro-
duction in the lab and those responsi-
ble for managing the “export” of 
knowledge and its application. In 
addition, new modes of object configu-
ration have been developed, such as 
computer simulation, that are of in-
creasing importance and which define 
new types of laboratories that perform 
according to new rules. The section 
entitled “Extending the Laboratory” 
addressed related questions by inquir-
ing into the hybrid forms of knowledge 
production, in which one or different 
laboratory regimes complement, 
interfere with, or parallel other knowl-
edge production regimes, both within 
science and across the institutional 
borders of science and research. The 
assumption of considerable variability 
in configuration forms, accompanying 
social forms, institutional arrange-
ments, temporal structures, spatial 
organizations, and so forth calls for an 
empirical program from a comparative 
perspective.  
Can laboratory-like features of knowl-
edge production be identified at the 
boundary of science and other societal 
realms, or even in areas of society 
altogether removed from science? A 
constructivist perspective informed by 
the difference approach has the poten-
tial to further our understanding of the 
so-called “knowledge society.” From a 
constructivist perspective, knowledge 
is not a mere resource; rather, the 
focus of interest is epistemic strategies 
of knowledge production and valida-
tion. With an eye to furthering our 
understanding of the knowledge soci-
ety it is recommended that those 
epistemic forms and social arrange-
ments that transcend the scientific 
laboratory be investigated more thor-
oughly than they have been to date, 
which would allow us to conceptualize 
the knowledge society as heterogene-
ously situated epistemic practices. A 
debate between constructivist science 
studies scholars and proponents of the 
knowledge society model has not (yet) 
taken place. This article is an attempt 
to identify issues and concepts that 
may serve as a point of intersection 
and contact between the two fields. 
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